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By Elizabeth Lower-Basch 
 
One of the hottest topics in human services is “pay-
for-success” approaches to government contracting.  
In this era of tight budgets and increased skepticism 
about the effectiveness of government-funded 
programs, the idea that the government could pay 
only for proven results has a broad appeal.  And 
those who have identified prevention-focused models 
that have the potential to improve long-term 
outcomes and save the government money are deeply 
frustrated that they have been unable to attract the 
funding needed to take these programs to scale.  
Some advocates for expanded prevention efforts are 
confident that these programs could thrive under pay 
for success and see such an approach as a way to 
break out of the harmful cycle where what limited 
funds are available must be used to provide services 
for those who are already in crisis, and there are 
rarely sufficient funds to pay for prevention. 
 
While performance-based contracting has existed for 
years in a range of human services areas —  
including job training and placement, welfare-to-
work activities, and child welfare —  pay for 
success, and in particular, the version referred to as a 
“social impact bond” (SIB) has drawn a great deal of 
attention at all levels of government in recent years.  
The Obama Administration has already carved out 
funding to support pay-for-success models in both 
workforce and ex-offender programs—  and in the 
2014  and 2015 budgets, proposed a $300 million 
fund at the Treasury to support state SIB initiatives 
as well as specific pay-for-success activities in the 
areas of job training, education, criminal justice, and 
housing.
1
  While only a couple of SIBs are currently 
underway in the United States, at least 14 states are 
currently at various stages of exploring SIBs in 
domains including criminal justice, health care, and 
early childhood education.
2
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Because of this high level of interest, many 
policymakers, practitioners, funders and advocates  
may need to respond to the question of whether a 
SIB would be a good way to expand funding for a 
particular intervention or population in a given state 
or community.  This paper provides background 
information and a framework to help answer this 
question.  It is based on CLASP’s review of the 
literature on SIBs, as well as on our extensive 
knowledge of the literature and experience with 
performance measurement systems, performance-
based contracting, and strategies to link public policy 
and implementation with research evidence for 
programs serving low-income and other 
disadvantaged populations. 
 
What is a Social Impact Bond?   
 
A “Social Impact Bond” or SIB is a new way to 
finance the expansion of prevention-focused social 
services that are expected to save government money 
in the future.  There is not a single agreed-upon 
definition for a SIB, but certain elements are 
common across most of the descriptions that are in 
use, as well as in the initial efforts to implement 
SIBs.  
 
Elements of the Prototypical SIB 
 
One of the most comprehensive definitions of a SIB 
is offered by the Nonprofit Finance Fund (NFF) on 
its Pay for Success Learning Hub.  NFF states “in 
this SIB’s model, an intermediary organization 
(sometimes described as a Social Impact Bond-
Issuing Organization or SIBIO) raises capital from 
private investors to fund multi-year delivery of 
preventative or early intervention social service 
programs traditionally funded by government 
agencies on an annual basis.  If social service 
providers are successful in achieving contractually 
agreed targets for performance and achievement 
outcome metrics, the government pays the investors, 
through the SIBIO, a return on their investment.  
This return on investment is funded from the savings 
produced in the population receiving the preventative 
or early intervention services by comparison to a 
defined population that has not.  If the outcome 
targets are not achieved, the government does not 
pay.”3 
 
This definition helps identify several characteristics 
of the prototypical SIB that distinguish it from other 
100% performance-based contracts: 
 
 Private investment: Under a SIB the up-
front funding to support the services is 
provided by non-governmental private 
investors, who will be repaid, with a bonus 
(or return on their investment), if the desired 
outcomes are achieved and who bear the risk 
of losing their investment if these outcomes 
are not achieved.  Under other entirely 
performance-based contracts, the service 
providers themselves must cover the up-front 
costs of the intervention and bear the risk of 
non-performance.
4
  The investors in a SIB 
could be profit-motivated entities, 
philanthropic organizations, or a mixture, but 
many of those promoting SIBs have 
emphasized the potential to bring in new 
funding from profit-motivated investors.  
 
 Focus on prevention or early intervention: 
Because SIBs are funded by investors with 
long-term horizons for receiving repayment, 
they are able to support on a pay-for-
performance basis, preventive activities that 
will not achieve the desired outcomes for 
several years.  As the service provider does 
not have to float the up-front costs, the period 
before outcomes are measured can be longer 
than is generally possible with a 
performance-based contract.  For example, 
several current SIBs are looking at recidivism 
rates by ex-offenders over a multi-year 
follow-up period.  By contrast, under existing  
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Figure 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source:  Laura Callanan, Jonathan Law, Lenny Mendonca, From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact Bonds to the US, 
McKinsey & Company, May 2012, 
http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Social-Innovation/McKinsey_Social_Impact_Bonds_Report.pdf. 
Reprinted with permission. 
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performance-based contracts, workforce 
programs typically make performance 
payments at the point of job placement and 
after 3 or 6 months of job retention; longer 
term outcomes are rarely tracked. 
 
 Multi-year service delivery: In spite of the 
focus on prevention, there are still limits to 
how long investors will wait for repayment.  
An analysis by McKinsey & Company of the 
market for SIBs suggests that the longest 
period a SIB could reasonably run before 
payments began is 4-6 years, with 2-3 years 
of service delivery and 2-3 years of follow-
up, which represents a balance between the 
desire to capture the effects of programs over 
time and the need to begin repayments to 
investors in a timely manner.
5
  If the initial 
results are promising, investors may be 
willing to support additional years of 
services.  Even 2-3 years of consistent 
funding would be an improvement for many 
service providers, who are currently subject 
to year-to-year fluctuations in funding.  
However, whether a SIB would provide more 
certainty to the service providers than 
standard contracting depends on the specifics 
of the arrangement between the intermediary 
and the service providers.
6
 
 
 Impact measurement: NFF’s definition 
explicitly states that performance will be 
measured based on a comparison between the 
outcomes of participants and those of a 
comparison group that has not received the 
services.  This implies that SIBs should only 
pay for impacts, or the effects of the program 
on participant outcomes, compared to what 
would have happened in the absence of the 
services.  In other performance-based 
contracts, payments have almost always been 
made based solely on the outcomes achieved 
by the participants without regard to whether 
the outcomes without the investment might 
have been.  For example, welfare-to-work 
providers are typically paid based on each 
participant who enters work, even though 
some of these participants presumably would 
have found jobs on their own if they had not 
received any services.  Even though the 
distinction between outcomes and impacts is 
well known in the evaluation literature
7
, the 
cost of formal evaluations and the need to 
provide quick feedback for both payment and 
program management purposes has typically 
prevented programs from using impacts as 
performance measures. 
 
 Cashable savings: In NFF’s prototypical 
SIB, the government undertaking the contract 
will not have to increase expenditures when 
the performance payments come due, because 
the governmental savings that have accrued 
as a result of the program’s performance will 
exceed the amount owed to the investors.  
This is only true if the savings are “cashable,” 
meaning that expenditures actually decrease, 
and the agency that must make the payments 
can access these savings.
8
  This may not be 
possible even for a highly cost-effective 
program if the savings are dispersed among 
different agencies or different levels of 
government or if the savings would take a 
longer period to accrue than investors are 
willing to wait.  Other organizations have 
suggested that SIBs may be an appropriate 
tool even if the cashable savings do not cover 
the performance payments, or for  funding 
programs that are beneficial to society but do 
not result in net governmental savings.
9
  This 
issue is discussed in more detail later. 
 
 Intermediary:  In the prototypical example 
of a SIB, the government’s pay-for-
performance contract is not directly with the 
organization(s) that provide the services- but 
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with an intermediary organization, which 
takes on much of the program management 
role, including recruiting investors, and 
selecting service providers and overseeing 
their work in order to ensure that the desired 
outcomes are achieved.  The intermediary’s 
contracts with the actual service providers 
may be traditional fee-for-service, pay-for-
performance, or some hybrid of the two.  In 
the stylized example, the government’s 
contract with the intermediary does not 
specify exactly what services will be 
provided in order to meet the desired 
outcomes but gives the intermediary the 
power to contract with a blend of service 
providers and to make mid-course corrections 
if the services are not performing as desired. 
 
SIBs in Practice 
 
While many SIBs are under discussion, only a few 
are far enough along that they can be compared to 
this list of characteristics.  The first SIB to be 
developed is the One Service project, which began 
providing services to ex-offenders being released 
from short (under 1 year) sentences at Peterborough 
Prison in the United Kingdom in 2010.
10
  While the 
Ministry of Justice has released preliminary data 
suggesting that the One Service project is having 
positive impacts,
11
 the project has not yet reached the 
first point at which impacts are formally measured 
and the first payments will potentially be made. 
The first U.S.-based SIBs — one in New York City 
to provide cognitive behavior therapy to young 
offenders in the Rikers Island jail and one in Salt 
Lake City to expand the availability of preschool for 
low-income and at-risk children — are at even earlier 
stages of implementation.  Projects in juvenile justice  
and services for chronically homeless individuals in 
Massachusetts and workforce services for ex-
offenders in New York are just launching now.  
Other projects are even earlier in the planning 
process. 
 
As shown in the overview of SIBs in Table 1, these 
early SIBs all share most of the features of the 
prototypical SIB but differ in some respects from the 
idealized description.  Some of the differences that 
are worth noting: 
 
 So far, up-front funding for SIBs has mostly 
been provided by foundations, or by private 
investors backed with a guarantee from a 
philanthropic source, rather than by purely 
profit-motivated investors.  If this continues 
to be true, it will constrain the potential of 
SIBs to bring in new funding, although SIBs 
may alter the relationship between 
philanthropy and service providers.  
However, some have suggested that for-profit 
investors will be more interested in SIBs 
when they have more of a track record.  This 
is a question to pay attention to as SIBs go 
forward. 
 
 The U.S. SIBs are all based on a specified 
intervention, rather than giving the 
intermediary the flexibility to meet the 
desired outcome goals through whatever 
means it chooses.  In the two Massachusetts 
examples, moreover, the state selected the 
providers directly through a competitive 
request for responses process, rather than 
leaving it to the intermediary to select them.  
The chosen organizations were given the 
opportunity to negotiate over the model and 
contract provisions. 
 
 It is difficult to determine from the materials 
that have been released whether the payment 
schedules for these SIBs are in fact based on 
cashable savings.  According to MDRC, the 
payment schedule for the Rikers Island SIB is 
based on a projection of cashable savings, 
with most of the benefits accruing if the need 
for jail beds can be reduced by at least 100 
beds.
12
  However, the cost that the UK 
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government determined it would pay for 
reduced incarceration in the Peterborough 
SIB was not based solely on cashable savings 
from having fewer trials and fewer weeks of 
imprisonment, but also included an estimate 
of the broader societal benefits of reduced 
crime.
13
 
 
 Of the SIBs examined, only the two that 
received federal funding from the U.S. 
Department of Labor — the New York State 
SIB for transitional jobs for ex-offenders and 
the Massachusetts SIB for juvenile justice 
services — are using a full experimental 
design with random assignment to determine 
the payment points.  Peterborough is 
evaluating the project by comparison to a 
matched cohort from other prisons, while 
New York City and Utah are comparing 
outcomes to historical performance.  (Details 
on the evaluation plan for the Massachusetts 
homelessness services project have not been 
released)  
 
At this point, it remains to be seen whether these 
differences between theory and practice are the result 
of the novelty of the approach, and will go away over 
time, or if these differences will persist.  For 
example, in the prototypical SIB, the contract 
between the intermediary and the government 
specifies the outcomes to be achieved for a 
population and how performance will be measured, 
but does not require the use of a pre-determined 
provider or services.  In the U.S. examples, however, 
the contracts have specified service strategies and 
providers.  Neither governments nor funders have the 
experience with SIBs to give them confidence in an 
open-ended approach.  It is not yet known whether 
they will develop such confidence with more 
experience with SIBs. 
 
What are the potential benefits of a Social Impact 
Bond? 
 
Proponents of SIBs have suggested they offer a wide 
range of potential benefits.
14
  Among the benefits 
that have been claimed for SIBs are that they will: 
 
 Save money, by increasing investments in 
prevention. 
 
 Expand available resources, and thus break 
the cycle in which investment in prevention 
gets squeezed out by current needs. 
 Allow providers increased flexibility to 
provide customized interventions to respond 
to client needs, with more time to 
demonstrate outcomes. 
 
 Embed rigorous evaluation and focus on 
outcomes into program operations, increasing 
learning, and ultimately performance. 
 
Given that no SIBs have yet reached the payout 
stage, it is not yet possible to assess whether these 
potential benefits will materialize.  Moreover, 
because of the differences between the first round of 
SIBs and the prototypical model, and because the 
early implementers have additional start-up costs 
(such as the need for policymakers and contracting 
staff to learn about the model), it is possible that 
these particular projects will not have all the benefits 
that are promised for SIBs, even if the underlying 
model is sound.  In these cases, one of the benefits of 
the project may be simply building the capacity and 
knowledge base for future efforts. 
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Table 1: SIBs in Practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Impact 
Bond 
Contracting entity Intermediary Investor 
Service 
Provider 
Independent 
Evaluator 
Peterborough 
Prison, UK
15
 
U.K. Ministry of 
Justice 
Social Finance Consortium of private 
investments and charities 
through Social Finance 
(SF) 
St. Giles Trust, 
The Ormiston 
Children and 
Families Trust, 
SOVA and 
YMCA 
QinetiQ and 
University of 
Leicester 
Rikers Island Jail, 
New York, NY
16
 
City of New York: 
Department of 
Corrections 
MDRC Goldman Sachs, with 
guarantee from 
Bloomberg Foundation 
Osborne 
Association and 
Friends of Island 
Academy 
Vera Institute 
of Justice 
Preschool 
Expansion, 
Salt Lake City, 
UT
17
 
Salt Lake County United Way of Salt 
Lake and Voices for 
Utah Children 
Goldman Sachs, J.B. 
Pritzker  
Granite School 
District, UT 
Dr. Mark 
Innocenti, Utah 
State 
University 
Youth Services,  
Massachusetts
18
 
Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, with 
additional support 
from U.S. 
Department of Labor 
Third Sector Capital 
Partners in partnership 
with New Profit, Inc. 
Consortium of 
commercial and 
philanthropic 
organizations that 
includes the Goldman 
Sachs Social Impact 
Fund, The Kresge 
Foundation, Living 
Cities, Laura and John 
Arnold Foundation, New 
Profit, and  
The Boston Foundation 
Roca with Chapin 
Hall at the 
University of 
Chicago 
Public 
Consulting 
Group and 
Sibalytics LLC 
Homelessness 
Services, 
Massachusetts
19
 
Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts 
Housing and Shelter 
Alliance, the United 
Way of Massachusetts 
Bay and Merrimack 
Valley, and the 
Corporation for 
Supportive Housing 
Consortium of private 
investors through United 
Way of Massachusetts 
Bay and Merrimack 
Valley and Third Sector 
Capital Partners 
Massachusetts 
Housing and 
Shelter Alliance 
Under contract 
negotiation 
New York City 
and Monroe 
County formerly 
incarcerated 
individuals
20
 
New York State 
Department of Labor 
Pay for Success 
program, with 
additional support 
from U.S. 
Department of Labor 
Social Finance Private and institutional 
investors including the 
Robin Hood Foundation 
through Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch 
Center for 
Employment 
Opportunities 
(CEO) 
Chesapeake 
Research 
Associates 
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SIBs in Practice (Continued) 
 
SIB Status Intervention  Goal and 
Evaluation 
Method 
Funding Repayment 
Provider 
Peterborough 
Prison, UK
21
 
Active: Operational 
since September 
2010 
Flexible mix of pre- 
and post-release 
mentoring and 
services for about 
3,000 adult male 
offenders 
completing short 
prison terms 
Reduced frequency 
of reconviction 
events; intervention 
group is compared 
to matched group 
released from other 
prisons 
Investment of £5 
million is provided 
by a consortium of 
private investments 
and charities 
through Social 
Finance (SF) 
Repayment by the 
Ministry of  
Justice and the 
Peterborough Big 
Lottery Fund 
Rikers Island Jail, 
New York, NY
22
 
Active: Operational 
since August 2012 
Cognitive behavioral 
therapy while in jail 
for young offenders 
between 16 and 18 
years old 
Reduced 
readmission bed 
days (RBDs, also 
called “future days 
in jail”) in DOC 
custody over 2 
years, number of 
participants served; 
comparison to 
benchmarks based 
on historical 
performance 
Investment of $9.6 
million is provided 
by Goldman Sachs, 
but 80 percent of 
investment is 
guaranteed by 
Bloomberg 
Philanthropies 
Repayment of up to 
$11.7 million by the 
New York City 
Department of 
Correction 
Preschool 
Expansion, 
Salt Lake City, UT
23
 
Active: Operational 
since August 2013 
Expansion of 
preschool services 
for up to 3,500 at-
risk children in 
Granite School 
District to reduce 
achievement gap, 
decrease use of 
remedial and special 
education services, 
and increase 
kindergarten 
readiness 
Reduced use of 
remedial and special 
education services 
by high risk 
subgroup identified 
based on low scores 
on  Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary test  
compared to 
historical benchmark 
for similar 
population 
Investment of up to 
$7 million is 
provided by 
Goldman Sachs and 
J.B. Pritzker 
 
 
Salt Lake County 
has committed 
$350,000 for 
repayment; sponsors 
are seeking 
additional funding 
from the State of 
Utah 
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SIBs in Practice (continued) 
 
SIB Status Intervention 
Goal and 
Evaluation 
Method 
Funding 
Repayment 
Provider 
Youth Services,  
Massachusetts
24
 
Intermediary and 
service provider 
selected August 
2012; terms of 
contract announced 
January 2014. 
received Federal 
Department of Labor 
Pay for Success 
funding Sept. 2013 
Seven-year project 
providing basic and 
post-secondary 
education and 
vocational training 
services to increase 
employment 
outcomes and 
decrease recidivism 
for 929 at-risk men 
between 17 and 23 
years old who are 
aging out of the 
juvenile justice and 
probation systems; 
additional federal 
funding from the 
Department of Labor 
could extend project 
to include 391 
additional young 
men 
Goals are reducing 
recidivism by 20% – 
60% and improving 
education and 
employment 
outcomes by 10% - 
20% over several 
years; program 
participants avoid 
recidivism for 48 
continuous months 
after being released 
from juvenile justice 
system.  Project will 
use a Randomized 
Control Trial to 
determine outcome 
payments 
Investment of at 
least $18 million is 
provided by 
consortium of 
commercial and 
philanthropic 
funding; RFR 
required applicants 
to demonstrate a 
track record of 
raising at least $10 
million in capital 
The Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts 
will make up to $27 
million in success 
payments; In 
addition to this, the 
US Department of 
Labor has granted 
Massachusetts 
$11.67 million for 
use as additional 
success payments to 
expand the program;  
$50,000 paid per 
foregone 
incarceration defined 
as two years of 
prison post-aging 
out 
Homelessness 
Services, 
Massachusetts
25
 
Intermediary and 
service provider 
selected July 2012; 
contract under 
negotiation 
Increase housing 
options through 
MHSA’s ‘Home & 
Healthy Good’ 
program based on 
the Housing First 
model to create  380 
additional housing 
units and provide 
stabilizing impact on 
chronically homeless 
people 
Reduced Medicaid 
and other service 
costs;  evaluation 
details have not been 
released 
Investment of $10 
million ($7 million 
of which is a SIB) of 
private investors 
through United Way 
of Massachusetts 
Bay and Merrimack 
Valley and Third 
Sector Capital 
Partners 
Repayment by the 
Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts   
New York City and 
Monroe County 
formerly 
incarcerated 
individuals
26
 
Received federal 
Department of Labor 
Pay for Success 
funding Sept. 2013 
Integrated services 
of life skills, 
transitional jobs, job 
placement and post-
placement support to 
2,000 individuals 
Goals are to increase 
employment 
outcomes by at least 
5 percent and reduce 
recidivism by at 
least 8 percent; 
project will use a 
Randomized Control 
Trial to determine 
outcome payments 
Investment of $13.5 
million from private 
investors (including 
$300,000 from the 
Robin Hood 
Foundation) through 
Social Finance and 
Bank of 
America/Merrill 
Lynch.  Rockefeller 
Foundation  has 
committed a 10 
percent first-loss 
guarantee of the total 
investment 
Repayment of up to 
$12 million from the 
NYDOL through the 
Governor’s Pay for 
Success Initiative 
Fund 
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SIBs have the potential to save money by increasing 
investments in prevention 
 
SIBs are often promoted as a way to save money by 
expanding a preventive activity which is so 
effective that it results in cashable savings that are 
large enough to cover the costs of repaying the 
investors and leave money left over.  For example, a 
presentation explaining the SIB model by Steven 
Goldberg, then affiliated with Social Finance, one 
of the organizations that is involved in the creation 
of SIBs, includes a diagram that shows a $60 
reduction in ongoing remediation costs as result of a 
SIB-funded intervention.  Even after accounting for 
the $25 cost of the intervention, this leaves $35 in 
cost savings, plus additional unquantifiable social 
benefits, such as reduced crime or improved family 
well-being.
27
  However, it is important to 
understand that this benefit is the result of the 
highly cost-effective preventive activities, not the 
SIB structure.  As discussed below, SIBs have 
financing and implementation costs in addition to 
the cost of the service delivery. 
 
Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is also unclear how many of the areas where SIBs 
have been proposed as a financing mechanism 
could result in this kind of cashable savings.  For an 
activity to pay for itself, a number of factors are 
required to align:  
 
 Populations can be identified with a 
reasonable amount of precision for which 
government agencies are likely to incur 
significant remediative costs within a few 
years in the absence of intervention; 
 These costs can be reduced by an amount 
sufficient to cover the cost of the program 
(and of the SIB) if the number of people 
needing services declines; and 
 
 The government agency that will incur the 
costs of remediation is able to identify the 
avoided costs and pass the funds on to the 
agency that entered into the SIB 
relationship.  This may be particularly 
challenging in the United States, due to the 
distribution of public activity across 
different levels of government.  For 
example, the savings from a local program 
may be primarily realized by Medicaid, 
which is funded by the federal and state 
governments. 
   
Based on its consultation with experts, McKinsey & 
Company suggests that the areas that seem most 
promising for short-term savings are criminal 
justice, which has the potential to save money by 
preventing incarceration among high risk groups, 
and preventive services for chronically homeless 
individuals, which has the potential to cut both 
shelter costs and the cost of health care and other 
emergency services.
28
  Many of the early SIBs are 
in fact in these areas.  For example, given the track 
record of reincarceration rates for juvenile offenders 
held at Rikers Island, New York City is confident 
Source: Steve Goldberg, Social Impact Bonds: A New Tool for Scaling 
Effective Nonprofits, Social Finance, PowerPoint, September 18, 2012, 
http://www.socialinvestingforum.com/Images/Social%20Solutions%2
0-%20Steve%20Goldberg.pdf.  
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that it will save the costs needed to repay the SIB if 
it is successful. 
   
It is possible that additional types of services will 
also meet these criteria.  For example, the Utah 
early childhood SIB is based on the expectation of 
saving money by reducing the need for special 
education services.  The intermediary has identified 
a population of children who, based on their scores 
on a standardized early childhood assessment (the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary test), are highly likely 
to need special education services in the absence of 
intervention.  The costs of special education 
services are closely linked to the number of children 
served.  The City of Salt Lake and the state of Utah 
will share in the cost savings; so far, only Salt Lake 
City has committed to participating in the 
repayment of the SIB, but the sponsors of the effort 
are hopeful of obtaining state support for additional 
years.
29
 
 
However, each proposed project will need to be 
examined individually to determine whether there 
are likely to be direct cashable government savings 
that exceed the costs of the program.  It is not clear 
whether all of the initial SIBs meet this test.  For 
example, as noted before, in the Peterborough 
prison SIB, while the outcome payments are based 
on Ministry of Justice calculations about the costs 
of reconviction, these calculations took into account 
the broader societal benefits of reduced reoffending, 
not just the direct savings from reduced 
reincarceration.
30
  
 
Most public services are designed to improve 
societal well-being, not to save taxpayer money 
directly.  The primary beneficiaries of social 
services are typically the participants themselves, 
who benefit from higher earnings, better physical or 
mental health, etc.  Taxpayers may benefit 
indirectly from reduced income support or social 
services, and increased taxes, but in most cases this 
is not sufficient to cover program costs, at least not 
in a 3-5 year time horizon.
31
  Many governmental 
activities, including public education, social 
security, and police and fire, are not intended 
primarily to save money but instead to achieve 
important social goals – a secure old age, an 
educated citizenry, safety and security. 
 
In fact, the same intervention may or may not result 
in cashable savings depending on how tightly it is 
targeted to a high-risk population.  Roca, the service 
provider for the Massachusetts youth services SIB, 
has long provided similar services to a broader 
population of disadvantaged youth in Boston 
through more traditional grants and contracts.  They 
are quite confident of their service model and its 
effectiveness in improving participants’ educational 
and employment outcomes, as well as in reducing 
recidivism.  However, since the payments in this 
SIB are based on the expected governmental 
savings from reduced incarceration, they had to 
negotiate a contract under the SIB that limits 
services to a group with a very high probability of 
incarceration.
32
 
 
There is not a consensus among SIB proponents as 
to whether SIBs should be limited to those cases 
that can result in cashable savings.  Some have 
suggested that SIBs could still be valuable for the 
reasons discussed below even when the programs 
do not pay for themselves.  In such cases, the 
governmental agency would have to make a value 
decision about how much it is willing to pay for the 
specified outcome.
33
  If projects will not lead to 
cashable savings, it is critical for policymakers to be 
clear about this and to have a clear plan for funding 
the outcomes payments when they come due.  
 
SIBs have the potential to expand available 
resources, and thus break the cycle in which 
investment in prevention gets squeezed out by 
current needs 
 
Even without generating cashable savings, SIBs 
could be transformative if they are effective in 
breaking through the cycle of underinvestment in 
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preventive activities.  There is widespread 
frustration with the lack of government support for 
preventive services, even with those models that 
have been demonstrated to create public value far 
beyond the cost of the services.  For example, 
research on early childhood home visiting, a 
rigorously studied intervention, has documented 
outcomes in areas including child health, school 
readiness, family economic self-sufficiency, 
reduced child maltreatment.
34
  And yet, federal 
funding for this program is only enough to support 
services to about 3 percent of those who could 
benefit— and is currently scheduled to expire at the 
end of federal fiscal year 2014.
35
   
 
It is not entirely clear why society underinvests in 
prevention.  The type of interventions best suited 
for SIBs – preventive activities that have cashable 
benefits in the relatively short term – seem like the 
economist’s proverbial $20 bill on the sidewalk – if 
it was that easy, why wouldn’t someone have 
picked it up already?  If rigorous studies proving the 
benefits of prevention exist and are sufficient to 
convince profit-motivated private investors that 
SIBs supporting such prevention efforts would be 
sound investments, it is hard to believe that it would 
not be possible to get direct public investment in 
these areas.  But the reality on the ground is that in 
many cases, governments have not been able to 
make this case.  It remains to be seen whether SIBs 
will be able to overcome the problem of 
underinvestment in prevention.  SIBs seem 
particularly well designed to address this issue 
when  underinvestment is driven by skepticism 
about whether the programs will actually have the 
effects that are claimed, because under SIBs 
governments will not have to pay for the 
interventions until the benefits are actualized.
36
 
 
SIBs may be particularly helpful in cases where 
services have been chronically underfunded and 
have had disappointing results.  In some cases, this 
is because highly disadvantaged individuals are 
only receiving a portion of the supports that they 
need to succeed.  For example, even a highly 
effective job training program may not result in 
increased employment if a participant does not have 
access to the reliable child care needed to show up 
at work on time each day.  However, if a program 
has not demonstrated good results, it is often 
difficult to make the case for increased funding.  If 
SIBs can show that increased funding for services 
can result in improved outcomes, this could 
significantly change the political dynamic.   
Some have suggested that SIBs could go further— 
and allow society to avoid having to make the tough 
tradeoffs between serving people who are already in 
dire situations and investing in services to prevent 
future hardships.  This is only the case for the 
subset of interventions that produce cashable 
savings sufficient to cover the costs of the SIB.  In 
other cases, SIBs only postpone the need to either 
cut services or increase spending until the date 
when outcome payments must be made.   
 
SIBs allow providers increased flexibility to provide 
customized interventions to respond to client needs, 
with more time to demonstrate outcomes. 
 
The possibility of flexible multi-year funding 
appeals to program operators who chafe at the 
restrictive rules of various funding streams and the 
need to blend multiple programs — and comply 
with multiple reporting requirements — in order to 
provide families with the full range of services that 
they need to thrive.  One of the potentials of SIBs is 
to offer service providers funding without these 
constraints.  For example, under the Peterborough 
SIB, the foundations had a lot of confidence in the 
intermediary— and were willing to trust it with 
flexible funding known as the “One Service” in 
order to achieve the desired outcome.  Coverage of 
the One Service project highlights the value of this 
flexible funding.
37
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Flexibility also allows the intermediary to select a 
mixture of service providers in order to respond to 
the diversity of clients and their needs.  Many 
smaller community-based organizations do not have 
the institutional capacity to compete for public 
funding, let alone the increased sophistication and 
financial support needed to be the lead organization 
in a pay-for-success contract.  However, some of 
these organizations may have cultural competencies 
and community connections that enable them to 
reach clients who would not respond to outside 
agencies.  Under a flexible SIB, the intermediary 
could contract with such community organizations 
as appropriate, and assist them in improving their 
capacity if needed. 
 
However, it is unclear whether other funders, 
especially profit-motivated investors, will be willing 
to support this sort of flexibility and uncertainty.  
As noted above, none of the U.S. SIBs have 
anywhere near the One Service project level of 
flexibility in providing services; in order to make 
the case for the likelihood of success, the 
intermediaries have had to specify exactly what 
services will be provided, and what entities will be 
delivering them.  Some have suggested that SIBs 
will accelerate the adoption of promising but 
untested strategies; this assumes that investors will 
be less risk averse than governments, because they 
will have the capacity to spread risk over multiple 
projects.
38
  At this stage, there are not enough SIB 
projects in the works for this to be the case, and the 
whole SIB structure is sufficiently novel that the 
investors appear to be sticking to models that have 
already been extensively evaluated. 
 
In addition, it is not clear that governments will 
actually be less risk averse because of the SIB 
structure.  This would be true if governmental risk 
aversion were primarily driven by the financial risks 
of supporting untested programs— and thus would 
be removed when these risks are transferred to the 
investors.  However, the political consequences of 
failure may not be completely mitigated even if the 
government does not have to pay for the 
unsuccessful services.  If voters still hold them 
responsible for failure to achieve the desired 
outcomes, elected officials are likely to be cautious 
about supporting untested innovations.  
 
Moreover, even if the government contract with the 
intermediary allows for flexible multi-year funding, 
this does not ensure that the intermediary’s contract 
with the service provider will be equally flexible.  
The roles and responsibilities of each organization 
will need to be negotiated for each project. 
  
SIBs can help embed rigorous evaluation and a 
focus on outcomes into program operations, 
increasing learning, and ultimately performance. 
 
Another potential benefit of SIBs is that they embed 
both rigorous outcome measurement and 
performance improvement into programs on an 
ongoing basis.  At the most basic level, if a SIB-
funded project does not achieve the specified 
outcomes, the investors will not be repaid and 
taxpayer funds will be preserved.  Because the 
investors and the intermediary have a strong interest 
in ensuring success, programs will assessed, 
tweaked, and re-assessed along the way.  To this 
extent, SIBs can be thought of as a way of 
purchasing improved project management capacity 
for program oversight, using data for performance 
measurement and making mid-course corrections. 
 
Most supporters of SIBs suggest that the potential 
benefits of SIBs go beyond the individual projects 
to promote more widespread use of evidence and 
improved performance elsewhere.  The process of 
developing a SIB project and identifying the 
outcomes to be measured and what governments are 
willing to pay for them can help generate a more 
robust public dialogue that clarifies the goals of 
programs and how we value their outcomes.  This 
dialogue can also create the impetus for funders, 
services providers and communities to focus their 
energy and attention on the outcomes that they wish 
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to achieve, rather than on process measures of 
performance. 
 
More concretely, some have suggested that SIBs 
could catalyze the use of administrative data for 
performance management.  Outcome measurement 
is less costly and thus more feasible at scale when it 
is based on existing data (e.g. unemployment 
insurance earnings records, health care system use, 
correctional systems outcomes), rather than 
requiring new data to be collected.  Use of 
administrative data also produces more 
representative samples than surveys with varying 
response rates and is not subject to distortions from 
self-reporting.  However, legal and technical 
barriers have, so far, limited the use of data in this 
way.  The hope is that SIBs will bring different 
agencies and evaluation experts together to address 
these barriers and bring down the cost of outcome 
measurement.  Intermediaries and investors will 
also want to have ongoing access to data in order to 
monitor program performance along the way. 
 
Because many potentially beneficial interventions 
have not yet been rigorously evaluated, some have 
highlighted the value to society of more evaluations 
of promising programs.  Indeed, rigorous 
evaluations can benefit policymakers and program 
operators in other states and localities, not just those 
who are supporting and operating the specific 
program that is evaluated.  However, the more 
flexible the program intervention, and the more 
mid-course corrections that a program takes, the 
harder it becomes to specify the intervention that is 
being tested and what the implications are for other 
programs.  Therefore, there may be tradeoffs 
between the power of the SIB to improve services 
in the specific location and the value of the 
evaluation for external audiences. 
 
While the clarity that random assignment 
evaluations provide is desirable, such experiments 
are often costly, can be challenging to implement, 
and are better suited to small-scale programs than to 
large-scale interventions that are designed to change 
broad systems.  They also are not well-suited at 
times when ongoing adaptation to the needs of the 
population and the context are priorities.  Given 
these challenges, most of the SIBs that are currently 
under way use comparison groups but not full 
random assignment.  In these programs, outcomes 
are compared to similar individuals at different 
locations, or in a prior time period.   
 
What are the potential downsides of a SIB? 
 
There are also potential downsides to the SIB 
model.  Some of these are inherent to the model 
while others are simply the issues that arise 
whenever high stakes are attached to outcome 
measures.  Policymakers should pay attention to 
these concerns both in assessing whether a SIB is an 
appropriate mechanism for funding a package of 
services and in negotiating the terms of the contract 
if they decide to proceed with a SIB. 
 
SIBs have costs above and beyond the cost of 
providing services. 
 
It is important to understand that the SIB 
mechanism imposes costs beyond the cost of 
providing services.  It will always be more 
expensive to support a SIB — which must pay a 
return to the investors, as well as cover the costs of 
the intermediary and the evaluators — than to 
support the exact same program with direct 
government funding.  Given the low interest rates at 
which governments can generally borrow funds, 
this is true even if the government would need to 
borrow in order to pay for the service.  Another way 
to think of this is to remember that the risk of non-
performance does not disappear in a pay for 
performance contract but is simply shifted from the 
government agency to the entity with which it 
contracts.  Basic finance tells us that investors will 
demand higher returns for more risky investments.  
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Higher costs are the inevitable consequence of 
shifting risk away.   
 
The best explanation we have found of how this 
might play out in practice is McKinsey’s pro forma 
analysis of a hypothetical SIB involving providing 
Functional Family Therapy (FFT) to juvenile 
offenders.  This model has been studied with 
rigorous evaluations, and there is good data 
available on the costs of service provision and the 
expected benefits to society.  McKinsey calculates 
that while government recoups the $3,191 cost of 
providing one young offender with FFT within 8 
years, with the added costs of a SIB, it would have 
to capture savings over 12 years in order to break 
even.  McKinsey concludes “SIBs are a more 
expensive way to finance the scaling up of 
preventive programs than if the government simply 
went to service providers and paid them to expand 
an intervention to more constituents… The 
‘premium’ inherent in scaling programs through 
SIBs is justified only if conventional options aren’t 
working, and if the SIB structure is adding value 
commensurate with its cost.” 39 
 
Particularly at this early point of development, SIBs 
also involve significant up-front investments of 
time, attention and money in order to identify the 
partners and negotiate a contract that works for 
everyone.  Massachusetts released its solicitation of 
applications to participate in two pay-for-success 
demonstrations in January 2012 and announced the 
organizations that had been selected to participate in 
August 2012.
40
  The details of the juvenile justice 
project were released in January 2014, and the 
details for the homelessness services project, 
including the key question of how performance will 
be measured and rewarded, have not been 
released.
41
  The U.S. Department of Labor 
published its solicitation under pay for success in 
June 2012, with applications originally due in 
December 2012.  That deadline was later extended 
to January 2013, and the awards were made in 
September 2013.
42
  In response to the Request for 
Information from the Department of Treasury 
regarding pay-for-success initiatives, a contracting 
officer with the Los Angeles Unified School 
District reported that staff had estimated the 
minimum up-front costs for personnel and legal fees 
associated with the development of a SIB at 
approximately $100,000 over 6-9 months.
43
   
 
While acknowledging that the transaction costs of 
the Rikers Island SIB are high, MDRC suggests that 
these costs will come down in future SIBs “as the 
model becomes increasingly known and accessible, 
standards for evidence develop, and investors come 
to see SIBs as less new and risky.”44  In fact, one 
justification for a federal role in supporting SIBs 
and other pay-for-success contracts at this stage is 
the recognition that these early demonstrations are 
building a knowledge base for further activity, and 
that the state or local government agency entering 
into the contract should not bear the full cost of this 
knowledge development.  However, even when 
SIBs are a fully mature model, they will still have 
incremental costs above the cost of service delivery, 
including the costs of the intermediary and 
evaluation, as well as the profit to the investors. 
 
SIBs involve loss of government control over 
programs and providers 
 
The flip side of increased flexibility for service 
providers is loss of government control over 
programs and providers.  Considering a SIB forces 
a hard look at the question of whether society truly 
only cares about outcomes, or if it turns out that 
there are actually process factors that matter as well.  
For example, many people would find it 
unacceptable to use the threat of physical 
punishment to force people to participate in a 
training program, even if it turned out to be 
effective.  Similarly, when it comes to vulnerable 
populations, such as children receiving child 
welfare services, or core governmental functions, 
such as education, policymakers and the public may 
want all individuals to receive a minimum amount 
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of services— and would not find it acceptable if a 
provider under a SIB chose to exclude some people 
from services.   
 
A SIB intermediary could also withdraw entirely 
from providing services in midstream.  It is possible 
that midway through a performance period, an 
intermediary could realize that the odds are highly 
unlikely for reaching the performance threshold 
needed to receive the payment under the contract.  
Under that condition, it would be fiscally prudent 
for the intermediary to cut its losses by withdrawing 
from the program.  If this occurs, the government 
would have to decide whether it is okay to stop 
providing services to this population, or find 
another way to provide such services (possibly 
through a more traditional fee-for-service contract, 
or a pay-for-performance contract with a lower 
threshold for performance). 
 
A related issue is that the prototypical SIB contract 
allows the intermediaries to select service providers 
and does not require an open competition.  The 
outcome incentives under SIBs ensure that an 
intermediary will not select providers whom it does 
not think can do the job, but there are no protections 
against what Tammany Hall boss George W. 
Plunkett memorably described as “honest graft.”45  
He argued that someone was going to get 
government contracts and make money, so you 
might as well pick your friends, as long as they are 
competent and capable of delivering the services the 
public needs.  While this is common practice in the 
private sector, since Tammany Hall days the U.S. 
public sector developed rules that are designed not 
only to ensure that the public pays a fair price for 
goods and services, but also to ensure that all 
companies have a fair chance at competing for that 
business. 
 
Past experience with outcome-based performance 
measures offers cautionary lessons about the 
unintended consequences of tying high stakes to 
such measures 
 
There is a long history of performance-based 
contracting in many government services, as well as 
other strategies for using both rigorous research and 
ongoing administrative data on outcomes to guide 
policy and program choice as well as 
implementation   The extensive literature about this 
experience offers a number of cautionary lessons 
about unwanted side effects of attaching significant 
consequences to failure to achieve designed targets 
on outcome-based performance measures, even 
well-intentioned ones.  Among the harmful 
consequences of tying high stakes to such measures 
are disincentives to serve the most needy 
populations (often referred to as “creaming” or 
“cream-skimming”), skewing services to focus on 
the selected outcomes of interest at the expense of 
other aspects of a program (“tunnel vision”) and 
winding up with programs that affect the measured 
indicators but not the underlying outcomes 
(“teaching to the test”).  Those undertaking SIBs 
should pay attention to these lessons, and include 
efforts to mitigate these negative effects. 
   
Creaming 
 
Creaming is a concern whenever the target 
population for an intervention varies significantly in 
their likelihood of achieving the desired outcome, 
and the service provider is likely to be able to 
predict with reasonable accuracy which individuals 
are more or less likely to succeed.  When high 
stakes, such as loss of the investment, are tied to 
failure to achieve the desired outcomes, service 
providers have an incentive to focus their efforts on 
individuals who are more likely to succeed 
(including those who are likely to succeed even in 
the absence of the program) and to deny services to 
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those who have significant barriers to participation 
or are otherwise less likely to succeed.   
   
Creaming is a particular issue whenever 
performance is measured only for the individuals 
who are actually served by a program (as opposed 
to everyone who is eligible for a service) and when 
the program has control over which individuals are 
served- and thus included in the outcome measure.  
For example, there has been a great deal of concern 
that the Workforce Investment Act outcome 
measures have contributed to programs being less 
likely to serve individuals with low literacy levels 
or who have other barriers to employment.  Many 
TANF programs have imposed up-front job search 
or community service requirements that have the 
effect of screening out individuals who are less 
likely to participate in work activities and thus will 
drag the state’s work participation rate down.  This 
reduces the value of the work participation rate as a 
measure of the program’s effectiveness in engaging 
recipients in work activities, because non-
participants are removed from the denominator. 
 
In a number of areas, programs have reported much 
better outcomes for participants than non-
participants, only to be found to have much more 
modest impacts when subjected to a formal 
evaluation.
46
  One key reason for this is that even 
when program participants share characteristics that 
are generally considered to make them “hard to 
serve” — such as criminal records, low basic skills 
and lack of credentials, or substance abuse history 
— as long as the program is voluntary, participants 
are likely to be more motivated than non-
participants.  Therefore, it is important that 
programs’ success be measured based on either 
impacts, or outcome measures for a population as a 
whole, not just for those it serves.   
 
Even when the intermediary or service provider 
does not have the ability to influence whose 
outcomes are counted, it can still be challenging to 
design an outcome-based performance contract in 
such a way that contractors have incentives to serve 
even the most disadvantaged participants.  For 
example, if contractors are paid a fixed amount for 
every individual who achieves the desired outcome, 
and they can accurately assess who is more or less 
likely to succeed, it would make business sense to 
provide services only to those who are closest to the 
margin for success.  There is no incentive for them 
to serve those who are likely to succeed without 
help – or those who are likely to require help that 
costs more than the agreed-upon payment.  
 
Some of the existing SIBs have thresholds for 
performance, below which the investors get no 
repayment.  One advantage of this approach is that 
it ensures that intermediaries cannot simply collect 
windfall payments for individuals who would likely 
have achieved the desired outcomes on their own.  
However, it is not clear that this is sufficient to 
ensure that even the most challenging participants 
receive appropriate services.
47
  Moreover, many of 
the initial SIBs set a cap on the total performance 
payment that may be collected by the intermediary.  
This was done to reduce the governmental 
uncertainty over the total cost of the SIB, but it has 
the potential to increase the disincentive to serving 
the most at-risk segment of the target population. 
 
In order to address concerns about creaming, it may 
be appropriate to require certain levels of access and 
participation as well as outcomes.  When it is 
possible to identify the characteristics that make 
certain individuals more challenging and costly to 
serve effectively, it can be helpful to provide tiered 
levels of outcome payments, where providers can 
earn additional amounts for succeeding with more 
disadvantaged individuals.  It may also be 
appropriate to provide payments for incremental 
success when serving very disadvantaged groups.  
When a SIB contract sets limits on the services that 
can be provided, and the provider has reason to 
believe that some individuals will not benefit from 
those particular services, there should be a 
mechanism to encourage providers to connect these 
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individuals with other services, rather than to 
simply exclude them. 
 
Tunnel vision 
 
Outcome measures can also distort the specific 
services that are offered.  This is particularly an 
issue when services are intended to result in 
multiple outcomes, but only some are measured and 
rewarded.  Performance measures that only capture 
one aspect of a program can result in that aspect 
being emphasized and others neglected.  
  
For example, high-quality preschool supports 
children’s development and well-being across 
domains, including social-emotional, physical and 
cognitive development.  However, there have been 
efforts that would measure the performance of early 
childhood education programs largely on student 
performance on a standardized literacy and math 
test.
48
  There is justifiable concern that such a 
narrow measure of effectiveness would create an 
incentive to devote class time to drilling on these 
measures, at the cost of time available for 
promoting broader social-emotional development.  
Many believe that the focus on the results of 
standardized tests in K-12 education has already 
taken away learning time from subjects that are not 
tested. 
 
In some areas, such as child welfare, there may 
actually be direct competition between desired 
goals, such as minimizing the amount of time 
children spend in out-of-home placement and 
ensuring that children are not returned to unsafe 
environments.  Both of these goals are critical to the 
well-being of the children who are served, and so an 
effective child welfare system must balance these 
competing goals in order to meet children’s needs.  
Performance measures that focus only on one of 
these goals could have serious harmful effects on 
children.   
 
Teaching to the test 
 
If multiple desired outcomes are highly correlated, 
there may be less reason to worry about only 
measuring some of them.  For example, a report 
commissioned by South Carolina to analyze the 
feasibility of using SIBs to support an expansion of 
early childhood home visiting programs argues that 
payments could be made conditional on reductions 
in pre-term births.  The researchers argue that 
because pre-term births are predictors of many other 
negative outcomes, this would be a fair indicator of 
the programs’ effectiveness and long-term savings 
potential.
49
   
 
However, the evaluation literature notes that tying 
high stakes to a predictive measure can have 
distortionary consequences.  Even if the correlation 
between a performance measure and the underlying 
outcomes of interest is strong at the beginning, this 
correlation tends to decrease over time as people 
figure out ways to game the system by improving 
results on the specified measures without actually 
changing the core outcomes in the desired 
direction.
50
  The best known example of this is 
“teaching to the test;” by focusing on test-taking 
skills, schools may be able to improve student 
performance on standardized tests without actually 
improving the student’s literacy or math 
comprehension.  
 
In response to these challenges, some of the 
governmental agencies using outcome-based 
performance payment systems have adjusted their 
systems over time, replacing measures that appear 
to have lost predictive value and re-setting the 
balance between competing values.
51
  However, by 
the nature of a SIB, it is essential to establish the 
outcomes that will be measured and the payments 
associated with them at the beginning — and not to 
alter them during the period of the contract. 
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A related issue is that in many cases, important 
outcomes cannot be measured directly but require 
proxies, such as test scores for knowledge, crime 
reports for actual crimes.  No outcome is ever 
perfectly measured, for a variety of reasons — 
people work off the books, give survey answers that 
they believe to be socially desirable, fail to report 
crimes, etc.  This does not mean that these measures 
can’t be useful — perfection is unachievable, and 
even noisy data can provide useful information, as 
long as the “noise” is not correlated with the 
intervention.  It is important to be aware of the 
potential differences between the measure and the 
underlying reality- and to spend some effort 
thinking about the possible causes and ways to 
address them.  It is also critical that the data on 
which performance payments are based should be 
collected and reported by an independent entity, in 
order to minimize the possibility of bias.  
 
When is a SIB Appropriate? 
 
Because of the high level of interest in SIBs, many 
policymakers, practitioners, funders and advocates 
are facing the question of whether a SIB would be a 
good way to expand funding for a particular 
intervention or population in a given state or 
community.  A wide range of areas have been 
suggested as possibilities for pay-for-success 
contracts.  Many of the early SIB projects or 
proposals have focused on reintegration services for 
ex-offenders and juvenile justice.  Other areas that 
have been proposed for SIBs include housing for 
homeless individuals and families, child welfare, 
early education, early childhood home visiting, job 
training, and health care. 
 
In this section, based on the information presented 
so far, we offer a preliminary overview of the 
questions that need to be considered for a SIB to be 
plausibly offered as a financing mechanism.  This is 
not a detailed checklist of the components needed to 
implement a successful SIB, but should rather be 
treated as a preliminary screen to narrow the field of 
programs to consider.  
 
 Does Everyone Agree on What Success 
Would Look Like?  While implicit in the 
very term “pay for success,” it is essential to 
highlight the importance of both agreement 
on the desired outcome and ability to 
measure these outcomes in ways that reflect 
the value added by services.  Is the 
government agency indifferent to the means 
by which the service provider will achieve 
the desired outcomes, or are there 
expectations about a minimum level and 
type of services that all eligible participants 
will receive?  These questions should be 
addressed very early in the process of 
exploring a SIB transaction.  Moreover, 
bringing stakeholders together for these 
conversations can be a very valuable activity 
for a community, even if a SIB is not the 
end result. 
 
 What is the Funding Mechanism?  Is the 
expectation that achieving the desired 
outcomes will result in cashable savings 
sufficient to repay the investors with 
interest?  If so, will these cashable savings 
apply to any success or only occur if 
outcomes are achieved at scale?  Does it 
require other levels of government or other 
government agencies to identify and 
contribute the funds that they will save as a 
result of the intervention?  If the project will 
not result in cashable savings, how will the 
agency determine the amount that it is 
willing to pay for the projected outcomes?   
 
 Is There a Plausible Evidence Base to 
Suggest the Intervention Will Succeed?  
Because one of the benefits of a SIB is the 
ability to provide flexible services, it does 
not make sense to limit SIBs only to 
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interventions that have been previously 
tested through a rigorous controlled 
evaluation.  However, there must be a 
sufficient evidence base in support of the 
intervention to make it plausible that the 
project will succeed.  One of the most 
promising ways to use SIBs is to build 
flexible additional services upon a core 
intervention that has already shown some 
success.  In practice, the investors —with 
input from the intermediaries and other 
parties —will be the de facto arbiters of 
what evidence is sufficient, as they will have 
their funding at risk if the project fails. 
 
 Can the Proposed Intervention be Taken 
to Sufficient Scale to Achieve Outcomes?  
In order for a SIB to succeed, there must 
both be an identifiable pool of individuals 
who could benefit from the services, and 
service providers who are able to expand or 
replicate the intervention.  Given the overall 
degree of underinvestment in prevention, 
this is usually assumed not to be a problem.  
However, when a SIB is being justified 
based on the ability of intervention to 
prevent a harmful outcome, it is important to 
be able to identify a group of participants 
who would be highly likely to have this 
outcome in the absence of the service.  For 
example, under the Massachusetts youth 
SIB, Roca, proposed to serve a specific 
population of young offenders who were 
highly likely to be re-incarcerated.  Since 
their work is geographically specific, they 
had to check to ensure there were enough 
people meeting these criteria in the targeted 
communities to make the project feasible.
52
 
 
 Does the Project Represent an Expansion 
of Funding and Services?  While some 
have suggested that SIBs should be used to 
redirect funding towards more effective 
programs, we are concerned about the 
possibility that they will simply shift 
funding towards more “SIB-able” project 
areas, at the expense of other areas, where 
outcomes are harder to measure, or the 
benefits are more diffuse.  Because the SIB 
model is largely untested, we believe that at 
least for now, it should be limited to new 
funding.  Given the additional costs 
involved in a SIB compared with direct 
contracting (whether fee-for-service or 
outcome-based), the case has not been made 
for taking funding away from existing 
programs.  In addition, SIBs should expand 
services to individuals who are not already 
being served, rather than replacing existing 
services.  This is important because 
intermediaries may stop providing services 
if they are not going to be able to achieve 
the performance targets.  This is only 
acceptable if the program is serving people 
who would not otherwise have received 
services. 
 
CLASP applauds the growing interest in 
improving outcomes in a range of areas where 
governments provide services.  SIBs and other 
pay-for-success mechanisms could potentially 
add value as a means of expanding investment, 
supporting prevention-focused activities, 
focusing on outcomes, and improving the 
evidence base for what works.  However, 
expanding use of SIBs should not be a goal; 
they are only worth supporting to the extent that 
they contribute to the goal of expanding the 
reach of high-quality prevention-oriented 
services, including to the most disadvantaged 
groups.  We hope that these questions will be of 
help to those considering SIBs in supporting 
their efforts to think strategically about whether 
SIBs are the right vehicle to use to expand this 
particular service, in this place, at this time, in 
order to further that goal.
  
      
 
 
1200 18th Street NW • Suite 200 • Washington, DC 20036 • p (202) 906.8000 • f (202) 842.2885 • www.clasp.org 
 
March 7, 2014 
Social Impact Bonds:  
Overview and Considerations 
   
 
                                                 
1
  See “Opportunity for All: Building and Using Evidence to 
Improve Results” FY 2015 Fact 
Sheet,  http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/bud
get/fy2015/assets/fact_sheets/building-and-using-evidence-to-
strengthen-results-in-government.pdf   and “Using Evidence 
to Get Better Results,” Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 2014, Office of Management and 
Budget, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2
014/assets/budget.pdf.  For further explanation of the 
Adminstration’s proposals, see Sonal Shah and Kristina Costa, 
“Social Impact Bonds: White House Budget Drives Pay for 
Success and Social Impact Bonds Forward,” Center for 
American Progress, April 23, 
2013,  http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news
/2013/04/23/61163/white-house-budget-drives-pay-for-
success-and-social-impact-bonds-forward/.  While Congress 
did not support this new fund in the FY 2014 appropriations 
bills, it did provide for Pay for Success models in both ex-
offender services and national and community service 
programs. 
2
 Sonal Shah and Kristina Costa, Social Impact Bonds: Social 
Finance - A Primer Understanding Innovation Funds, Impact 
Bonds, and Impact Investing, November 5, 2013, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/SocialFinance-brief.pdf. Updated 
lists of SIB activity are also maintained by Social Finance at: 
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/social-impact-
financing/social-impact-bonds/history-sib-market/united-states  
and Instiglio at: http://www.instiglio.org/sibs-worldwide/. 
3
 “About Pay for Success Social Impact Bonds,” Nonprofit 
Finance Fund, http://payforsuccess.org/about. 
4
  In Social Impact Bonds: A Promising New Financing Model 
to Accelerate Social Innovation and Improve Government 
Performance, Center for American Progress, February 2011, 
Jeffrey Liebman notes the fact that many service providers do 
not have the capacity to provide the up-front funding for 
services or to bear the risk of non-performance, as a reason 
why 100% performance based contracts are relatively rare in 
the human services world. When they exist, as in New York 
City’s welfare to work program, they tend to be taken up by 
large multi-site for-profit service providers.  More common 
are partially performance-based contracts, where the 
government makes up-front payments to cover at least a 
portion of the costs of service delivery and providers can earn 
additional payments when participants achieve the desired 
outcomes.  The ability to engage small nonprofit service 
providers who may not have the financial capacity to taken on 
                                                                                     
100% performance based contracts is sometimes cited as a 
benefit of SIBs. 
5
 Laura Callanan, Jonathan Law, Lenny Mendonca, From 
Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact Bonds to the US, 
McKinsey & Company, May 2012, 
http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Social-
Innovation/McKinsey_Social_Impact_Bonds_Report.pdf. 
6
 Even though certainty of funding is sometimes listed as one 
of the benefits of a SIB, this does not appear to be inherent to 
the model.  The intermediary could choose to change service 
providers in mid-stream if it determined that the initial 
provider chosen was failing to deliver adequate services. 
7
 Because the quality of a program is only one factor in 
determining outcomes, there is not necessarily a correlation 
between the programs with the best outcomes and the 
programs with the largest impacts, if programs are in different 
economic contexts or serve different populations. In particular, 
there is an extensive literature that shows that programs 
serving highly disadvantaged populations often achieve lower 
levels of outcomes than ones that serve more advantaged 
population, even when they result in larger changes in 
participants’ outcomes, compared to what would have 
happened in the absence of the program. 
8
 "Guidance - Social Impact Bonds: A Data Gathering How-to 
Guide for Commissioners," Cabinet Office, Government of 
the United Kingdom, February 5, 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-impact-
bonds-how-to-guide-for-commissioners. 
9
 Timothy Rudd, Elisa Nicoletti, Kristin Misner, Janae 
Bonsu, Financing Promising Evidence-Based Programs: 
Early Lessons from the New York City Social Impact Bond, 
MDRC, December 
2013, http://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/Financing_Prom
ising_evidence-Based_Programs_FR.pdf. 
10
 “Peterborough Social Impact Bond Fact Sheet,” Social 
Finance, One Service and the U.K. Big Lottery Fund, 2011, 
http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/sites/default/files/SF_Peterbo
rough_SIB.pdf. 
11
 Jenna Pudelek, “HM Prison Peterborough Social Impact 
Bond Has Led to a Fall in Reconvictions, Official Figures 
Show,” Third Sector News, June 14, 2013, 
http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/news/1186265/. 
12
 Rudd et al., 2013, page 15.  The city believes it can save 
$4,600 per bed for reductions of less than 100 beds, but 
$28,000 per jail bed for reductions of 100 beds or more. 
13
 Emma Disley, Jennifer Rubin, Emily Scraggs, et 
al., Lessons Learned From the Planning and Early 
Implementation of the Social Impact Bond at HMP 
Peterborough, Ministry of Justice and RAND Europe, May 
  
 
 
 
 
 
22 
22 P. 
                                                                                     
2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upload
s/attachment_data/file/217375/social-impact-bond-hmp-
peterborough.pdf.  
14
 See for example, Jeffrey B. Liebman, Social Impact Bonds: 
A Promising New Financing Model to Accelerate Social 
Innovation and Improve Government Performance, Center for 
American Progress, February 2011, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/social_i
mpact_bonds.pdf and Steve Goldberg, Social Impact Bonds: A 
New Tool for Scaling Effective Nonprofits, Social Finance, 
PowerPoint, September 18, 2012, 
http://www.socialinvestingforum.com/Images/Social%20Solut
ions%20-%20Steve%20Goldberg.pdf. 
15
 Disley et al., 2011; Siôn Cave, Darrick Jolliffe , et al., 
Peterborough Social Impact Bond: An Independent 
Assessment, Ministry of Justice, May 2012, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/217392/peterborough-social-impact-bond-
assessment.pdf; and Social Finance, "Criminal Justice," 
September 2010, 
http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/work/sibs/criminaljustice. 
16
 Esmé E. Deprez and Michelle Kaske, “Goldman Sachs 
Inmate Bet Fuels Social-Impact Bonds: Muni Credit,” 
Bloomberg, Aug 21, 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-21/goldman-sachs-
inmate-bet-fuels-social-impact-bonds-muni-credit.html; 
George Overholser, Case Study: Preparing for a Pay for 
Success Opportunity, The Rockefeller Foundation and Third 
Sector Capital Partners, April 2013, 
http://www.thirdsectorcap.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Third-Sector_Roca_Preparing-for-
Pay-for-Success-in-MA.pdf; John Olson and Andrea Phillips, 
Rikers Island: The First Social Impact Bond in the United 
States, Goldman Sachs, Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, Pay for Success Financing, volume 9, issue 1, April 
2013, http://www.frbsf.org/community-
development/files/rikers-island-first-social-impact-bond-
united-states.pdf; and Rudd et al., 2013. 
17
 Emilee Eagar, “Public-Private Partnership Pumps Dollars 
into Preschool Program,” Deseret News, July 16 2013, 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865583232/Public-
private-partnership-pumps-dollars-into-preschool-
program.html and Kelli Fratto and Austin Isbell, United Way 
of Salt Lake Announces Results-based Financing for Low-
income Preschool Students, United Way of Salt Lake, June 13, 
2013. 
18
 Overholser, 2013; Elkins, 2013; Massachusetts Executive 
Office of Labor and Workforce Development Project Name: 
The Massachusetts Juvenile Employment and Recidivism 
Initiative, PFS Grantee Summary, Workforce Innovation 
                                                                                     
Fund; and Press Release, Office of Governor Deval L. Patrick, 
2014.  
19
 Overholser, 2013; Kristina Costa and Jitinder Kohli, Social 
Impact Bonds: New York City and Massachusetts to Launch 
the First Social Impact Bond Programs in the United States, 
Center for American Progress, November 5, 2012, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/
11/05/43834/new-york-city-and-massachusetts-to-launch-the-
first-social-impact-bond-programs-in-the-united-states/; Lili 
Elkins, Supporting At-Risk Youth: A Provider’s Perspective on 
Pay for Success, Roca Inc., Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, Pay for Success Financing, volume 9, issue 1, April 
2013, http://www.frbsf.org/community-
development/files/supporting-youth-provider-perspective-pay-
for-success.pdf; Massachusetts Executive Office of Labor and 
Workforce Development Project Name: The Massachusetts 
Juvenile Employment and Recidivism Initiative, PFS Grantee 
Summary, Workforce Innovation Fund; “The Massachusetts 
Juvenile Justice Pay for Success Initiative,” Third Sector 
Capital Partners, 
http://www.thirdsectorcap.org/massachusetts-juvenile-justice-
pfs/; and Press Release, Massachusetts Launches Landmark 
Initiative to Reduce Recidivism Among At-Risk Youth  $27 
million Initiative is Largest Financial Investment in a Pay for 
Success Contract in the Country, Office of Governor Deval L. 
Patrick, January 29, 2014, http://www.thirdsectorcap.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/1.29.2014-SIF-Press-Release.pdf. 
20
 Center for Employment Opportunities, 2013; New York 
State Department of Labor Project Name: New York State Pay 
for Success Projects: Employment to Break the Cycle of 
Recidivism, PFS Grantee Summary, Workforce Innovation 
Fund; Press Release, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 2013; 
and Press Release, Office of Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, 
2013. 
21
 Disley et al., 2011; Cave et al., 2012; and Social Finance, 
2010. 
22
 Deprez et al., 2012 and Costa et al., 2012. 
23
 “FACT SHEET: The Utah High Quality Preschool 
Program,” Goldman Sachs, J.B. and M.K. Pritzker Family 
Foundation and United Way of Salt Lake, 2013, 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-
lending/urban-investments/case-studies/impact-bond-slc-
multimedia/fact-sheet-pdf.pdf; Sean Meehan, “Goldman Sachs 
Makes Investment, Gets Returns on Utah Preschool Program,” 
Education Week, June 25, 2013, 
http://www.utahchildren.org/newsroom/what-s-new/item/375-
goldman-sachs-makes-investment-gets-returns-on-utah-
preschool-program; and "Urban Investments: Social Impact 
Bond for Early Childhood Education," Goldman Sachs, 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-
   
      
 
 
1200 18th Street NW • Suite 200 • Washington, DC 20036 • p (202) 906.8000 • f (202) 842.2885 • www.clasp.org 
23 P. 
 
Social Impact Bonds: Overview and Considerations 
                                                                                     
lending/urban-investments/case-studies/salt-lake-social-
impact-bond.html.  
24
 Overholser, 2013; Elkins, 2013 
25
 Joe Finn and Jeff Hayward, Bringing Success to Scale: Pay 
for Success and Housing Homeless Individuals in 
Massachusetts, Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance 
and United Way of Massachusetts Bay and Merrimack Valley, 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Pay for Success 
Financing, volume 9, issue 1, April 2013, 
http://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/bringing-
success-scale-pay-for-success-housing-homeless-individuals-
massachusetts.pdf; Mary Moore, “Social Impact Bonds are 
Advancing,” Boston Business Journal, July 12, 2012, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/print-
edition/2012/07/13/social-impact-bonds-are-
advancing.html?page=all; and “Social Impact Bonds Hit 
Massachusetts,” Mission Investors, August 28, 2012, 
https://www.missioninvestors.org/news/social-impact-bonds-
hit-massachusetts. 
26
 “CEO Awarded Pay for Success Grant,” Center for 
Employment Opportunities, September 24, 2013, 
http://ceoworks.org/ceo-awarded-pay-success-grant/; New 
York State Department of Labor Project Name: New York 
State Pay for Success Projects: Employment to Break the 
Cycle of Recidivism, PFS Grantee Summary, Workforce 
Innovation Fund; Press Release, “Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch Introduces Innovative Pay-for-Success Program in 
Partnership With New York State and Social Finance Inc.,” 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch, December 30, 2013, 
http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/press-releases/global-
wealth-and-investment-management/bank-america-merrill-
lynch-introduces-innovat; and Press Release, “Governor 
Cuomo Announces New York the First State in the Nation to 
Launch Pay for Success Project in Initiative to Reduce 
Recidivism,” Office of Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, 
December 30, 2013, 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/12302013-pay-for-success-
project. 
27
 Goldberg, 2012.  
28
 Callanan et al., 2012.   
29
 H.B. 96, a bill providing state funding for performance-
based contracts with private entities, was passed by the Utah 
House in February 2014, but had not yet been taken up by the 
Senate at the time of this writing,  
http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/static/HB0096.html. 
30
  Disley, et al., 2011. 
31
  Liebman, 2011. 
32
 Overholser, 2013. 
33
 Liebman, 2011 and Rudd et al., 2013. 
                                                                                     
34
 "Home Visiting Evidence of Effectiveness," U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services, 
http://homvee.acf.hhs.gov/document.aspx?rid=5&sid=20&mid
=1. 
35
 Pew Center on the States, States and the New Federal Home 
Visiting Initiative: An Assessment from the Starting Line, The 
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2011, 
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2011/ass
essment_from_the_starting_line.pdf. 
36
  In practice, states will probably need to obligate funds for 
SIBs up front, and may even need to place them into reserve 
accounts in order to enter into a multi-year contract.  See 
Kristina Costa, Sonal Shah, Sam Ungar et al., “Social Impact 
Bonds: Frequently Asked Questions,” Center for American 
Progress, December 5, 2012, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/FAQSocialImpactBonds-1.pdf.  
37
 “Why the Peterborough Prison Social Impact Bond is 
Working for Ex-offenders,” Pioneers Post TV, June 11, 2013, 
http://www.pioneerspost.com/pp-tv/20131106/why-the-
peterborough-prison-social-impact-bond-working-ex-
offenders. 
38
 Liebman, 2011.  A more indirect version of this argument is 
the suggestion that foundations will be more willing to support 
rigorous evaluations of promising practices if they know that 
such evaluations will lead to ongoing support for these 
interventions through SIBs. 
39
 Callanan et al., 2012.   
40
 Press Release, “Massachusetts First State in the Nation to 
Announce Initial Successful Bidders for 'Pay for Success' 
Contracts,” Massachusetts Executive Office for 
Administration and Finance, August 01, 2012, 
http://www.mass.gov/anf/press-
releases/fy2013/massachusetts-first-state-in-the-nation-to-
announce-ini.html. 
41
 Press Release, Office of Governor Deval L. Patrick, 2014.  
42
 “US Labor Department Awards Nearly $24 Million in Pay 
for Success Grants,” United States Department of Labor, 
News Release Number 13-1936-NAT, September 23, 2013, 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/eta/ETA20131936.htm. 
43
 “Comment from Galen van Rensselaer,” Department of the 
Treasury (TREAS) Notice: Strategies To Accelerate the 
Testing and Adoption of Pay for Success (PFS) Financing 
Models, Dec 2, 2013, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TREAS-
DO-2013-0006-0010. 
44
 Rudd et al., 2013, page 53. 
45
 George W. Plunkitt, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of 
Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics, uploaded 
December 29, 2008, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2810. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
24 
24 P. 
                                                                                     
46
 See, for example Burt S. Barnow. Exploring the 
Relationship Between Performance Management and 
Program Impact: A Case Study of the Job Training 
Partnership Act, Institute for Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins 
University, 1999 and Stephen Freedman et al. National 
Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: Evaluating 
Alternative Welfare-to-Work Approaches: Two-Year Impacts 
for Eleven Programs, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services and U.S. Department of Education, 2000. 
47
 This is generally an issue because of the asymmetry of 
information, where the service provider usually knows more 
about the likelihood of success with a given individual than 
the contracting government agency.  Mathematically, if the 
intermediary or service provider is able to predict the expected 
cost for a given individual of providing services needed to 
achieve the specified outcome, in a straight pay-per-outcome 
contract, the intermediary should rationally only serve those 
whose expected cost to serve is less than the payment level.  If 
the contract requires a threshold level of performance of X% 
of participants, the intermediary should serve the (X+n)% 
easiest to serve participants, with n being an additional 
number that covers the uncertainty in the prediction. 
48
 Richard Rothstein, “Too Young to Test,” American 
Prospect, October 17, 2004, http://prospect.org/article/too-
young-test. 
49
 “Social Impact Bond RFI #1: Request for Information 
(RFI),” South Carolina Department of Health and Human 
Services, September 17, 2013, 
https://www.scdhhs.gov/sites/default/files/Social_Impact_Bon
d_RFI_%231.pdf. 
50
 Carolyn J. Heinrich and Gerald Marschke, “Incentives and 
Their Dynamics in Public Sector Performance Management 
Systems,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 
29, No. 1, 183–208 (2010). 
51
 Heinrich, 2010 and Swati Desai, Lisa Garabedian and Karl 
Snyder, Performance-Based Contracts 
in New York City: Lessons Learned from Welfare-to-Work, 
Rockefeller Institute of Government, June 2012, 
http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/workforce_welfare_and_social_s
ervices/2012-06-Performance-Based_Contracts.pdf.  
52
 Overholser, 2013. 
